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Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (2003)
owadays many people very mechanically think that solving
{shareholders rights} is everything and, once that happens,
the bank will become successful. In reality simultaneously
with shareholder rights reform we must als strengthen the
bank's internal corporate governance . .. It is simply not true
that once we resolve our listing, then everything will be "O K.''
- Interview with Indu trial and
ommercial Bank hairman, Jiang Ji anqing
(Ling Huawei and Zhao Xiaojian 200 : 74) .

China Banking Regulatory Commission (2004)
... reforms shall be centered on innovating the Banks' f hina
onstniction Bank and Bank of hina] management regime
and systems improving their corporate governance innovating their operating mechanisms and thereby boosting their
profit-earning capacity.
-Guidelines on orporate ov man e Reform and
upervi ion of Bank of hin a and hina o n tru tion Bank
( hina Banking Regulatory Commission 2004: Article 2 )
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Bank of Communications Chairman Jiang Chaoliang (2006)
In order to fully establish a modern corporate governance system, we must consider four aspects: the lessons learned from
the past decade; shareholder consciousness, which is the soul
of modern corporate governance; shareholder diversification·
and the function of the Party Committee within corporate
governance. These are the premises that must be considered
in developing a Chinese style corporate governance structure.
You cannot say just because we are implementing corporate
governance that we don't need the Party Committee anymore.
That is not realistic . .. The corporate governance that we are
designing has: the shareholders' meeting, the board of directors, the supervisory board, senior management, and the Party
Committee, all of which work together seamlessly in corporate governance . .. The establishment of a Party Committee
within an enterprise whose shares are controlled by the state
is a reality within the Chinese corporate governance system
that must be accepted.
-Interview with China Con truction Bank Chairman,
Jiang Chaoliang (Hu Runfeng, Cheng Zhe, and Fu Tao
2006: 72).

Former World Bank Beiiing Mission Director Pieter Bottelier
(2006)
... it is clear that structural reforms are moving in the right
direction . ... Management and regulation of the banking sector is becoming more professional and more in line with international standards. Clarity of ownership and of the responsibilities of the management and board has improved. (Bottelier
2006: 1)
INTRODUCTION

n the wake of the Asian Financial Cri is of 1997-98, and acceleratI ing
after 2003 the People's Republic of Chin a (PRC or China) has
implemented an ambitious reform program directed at the commanding heights of wha t once passed for hina ' financial system-the
large state-owned and tare-m anaged commercia l bank . Contrary to
a good deal of advice offered by policy and finance pecialist China
did not liquidate or fully privatize thes instituti ons. Instead, th e PRC
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sought co avoid the ignificant social (and no doubt political) cost
associated with liquidation, or real privatization, by instead changing
(1) th e internal dynamics of, and (2) external environments applicable
to, its behemoth banking in titutions.
Critical among the many reform measures applied after 2003 were
those directed at internal corporate governance and owner (shareholder) monitoring of the e banks, including: (1) corporatization of
these institutions under China's post-1994 corporate statute,2 (2) the
creation of a state inve cment agency tO act as a real "principal" (shareholder ) in the newly corporatized, yet "agent" (director)-managed,
entities, (3) the introduction of minority trategic in vestment from
abroad (and cedi ng of board eat to representatives of thi foreign
capital or execution of " technical assistance" agreements), (4) the
listing of a portion of the banks' hare capital on foreign and Chine e exchanges, and (5) the appointment of ' independent directors'
(duli dongshi) to the boards of the now public commercial banks.
These ub tantial organizational and capital structure innovations
were only part of a wide-ranging menu of reform measure applied
to all a pects of bank operations. As Pieter Bottelier, the head of the
first po t-1949 Beijing World Bank Mission (1993-97) has written
recently: 3
. . . the speed of the financial sector reforms has accelerated in
recent years. Most state banks have been incorporated under
hina's Company Law, restructured and recapitalized. Many
attracted foreign strategic minority partners and the four
m st important state commercial banks listed successfully on
the Hong Kong and .. . domestic stock exchanges .... Financial
sector problems ... such as the massive nonperforming Loans
[ PLsj overhang and the non-tradable government shares in
listed companies are gradually being resolved. The legal and
regulatory framework governing China s financial system is
being ad;usted to meet international standards and domestic needs . .. it is clear that structural reforms are moving in
the right direction. Management and regulation of the banking sector is becoming more professional and more in line
with international standards. Clarity of ownership and of the
responsibilities of the management and board has improved.
(Bottelier 2006: 1)

Thi chapter focuses on a relatively narrow a pect of the
legal and regulatory sub-theme of China' commer ial bank reform
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program: the law- and enterprise organization-based approach that
has sought to change (1) how Chinese banlcing firms are governed
internally, and (2) how firm managers are monitored externally by
hareholder -the notional "owners" of the fum. 4 In doing o, this
chapter trives to : illuminate how China's banks are governed even
after formal and in titutional reform the effect of widely tou ted
legal governance adjustment , and the ways in which the individu als who really control commercial banking firm are monitor d and
held accountable-or not-in China's truly "mi ed" ociali t-market
economy. Thus, thi chapter is (1) a rebuttal to literall y cou nties
theoretical writings and public proclamations ab ut the ti e between
"modern" or "international standard" firm governance reform on one
side and resulting bank performance on the other (Ba el 1999: 3).
It is (2) a rebuttal to the many regulators, official , analy t , participants, and investors who, knowing far better, pronounce that the
internal firm governance reform at China's state-owned bank i basica.lly "complete" while counseling a renewed focu on firm external
mea ure (tax policy, creditor protection and bankruptcy law and
enforcement, interest rate policy, reserve requirements, and so on .
(Xie Ping 2006 : 20)). Finally, this chapter ma y stand a a warning
a to how easily and incompletely ob ervers and investor ( hinese
and foreign) digest and credit proclaimed lega l change, and overlook
other perhaps more effective in trument of monito ring and corpora te
governance.
Thi chapter place some empha i on the to k price of hina'
Ii ted banks at a time when public tock valuation for hinese
Ii ted companies do not yet reflect firm performance (a opposed
t the overall promi e of "ri ing China" and herd-mentality participation in "China plays"). otwith randing the exi tence of a
reported stock price will be hown to have ignificance in hina,
where the forma l corporate go ernance mechani m introduced here
and widely hailed in both off ring pro pectu e and the international financial press, may prove som what irrelevant. The irony of
course is that th e true corporate governance mechanism hown to
be effective are thoroughly rooted in a pre-Reform vi ion of stateowned enterprise (SOE) and work unit (danwei) governance-the
nomenklatura system-that may now evidence a strangely benign,
or at lea t unforeseen, entanglement with the decidedly po t-Reform
phenomenon of
mi-efficient international and domestic capital
market.
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CO RPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM-PART
O F A RICHER REFORM NARRATIVE
Of the different kind of medicine applied to China
tatedomin ated banking sector ince the early 1990s, only some of the
reforms implemented to date relate to corporate governance per se.
However, tho e ame corporate governance-directed reform became
relevant in the come t of a number of prior or simul taneou noncorporate governance-focused change . T he other aspects of financial
ector reform de cribed informalJy · include: di memberment of the
mono-ba nk y tern char wa the People s Bank of China (PB ) in the
late 1970 and establi hment of "spe ialized ' financial institutions·
the gradual introduction of domestic commer ial banking competition with " national" cope; e tablishmen t of the "modern enrerpri e
sy tern for the (n n-banking) tate-owned firms that made up the
indu trial and rvice economy; separation of the bank conflicting
'policy ' and 'comm rcial" function ; promulgation of sub tantive
law and regulation authorizing and governing the financial ector
(followed by the creation of an e pert banking industry regulator) · th e
appli ation of do e domestic regu lation (a nd in ome ca es, dom e tically mandated conformity with global tandards like the 1995 PR
Commercial Bank Law' incorporation of the Ba el Accord 8% floor
on ri k capita l (achieved in 2000)); enterpri se income tax reduction
for commercial bank (fro m 55% to 33%); uccessive recapita lization , in luding what may amount to delayed recapitalization implemented by the di po .ition of nonperforming loans (NPL ) to o-ca lled
a et managem nt ompanie · and the taged introduction of foreign
competition-culminating in the effective opening of the hine commer ial banking ector by December 11 2006, promi d at the rim
of the PRC ac e ion to the World Trade Organization (WT ) in
late 2001.
Zhou iao huan interviewed as Pre idem of the hina
tion Bank (
B) in 2005, and later overnor of the PB
a erred
that th primary goal behind financial ector r form after 1999 and
the A ian Financial Crisis wa solvency which directly coun eled
recapita lizati n of the bank by the c ntral go ernment di po ition
of bad (unco il ctibl e) a ets, and (volun ta ry) c nformity with internati na l apita l adequacy tandard (a ll a revea led and c nfirmed
by modern firm- level accounting) .
twith randing thi hort-term
focu s Zhou X iaochuan a lso aw recapitalizati n and increa ed balance heet trength as key ba e for (1) imminent corporatization and
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(2) finance-rai ing on the public capital markets. As Zhou aid at that
time:
In the past we treated the state-owned commercial banks
as state administrative organs and there was a good deal of
administrative interference in operations, with incorrect evaluation yardsticks· w e saw improvements [in addressing} these
problems after the Asian Financial Crisis. From what I have
observed, among the various measures several are really important: the first point is that accounting principles have been
continually getting better; the second point is the implementation of a five-tier loan classification system-allowing us
to set aside realistic reserves based upon the proportion of
risk-the third point was the clear setting-out of the stateowned banks' reform road at the Th ird Plenum of the sixteenth Party Congress in 2003. As the "Resolution on everal
Questions Regarding Perfection of the ocialist Mark et Economic System" passed at that Plenum pointed out, we must
"implement share system reform [corporatization] at qualifying state-owned banks, accelerate the disposition of nonperforming loans, replenish capital, and create the conditions
for listing [of the reformed banks]. This road was selected
only after a whole series of careful studies and analysis. (Ling
Huawei 2005: 73)

The e view and rh e sixteenth Party Congre p Iicy directi on cited
by Zhou, were confirmation of th e (fa r more important) internal
National Finance Working Group policy aim arti ulated ea rli er in
February 2002:
{We] should in accordance with the needs of establishing th e
modern enterprise system transform the w holly state owned
commercial banks into modern finan cial enterprises w ith perfected governance structures, healthy operating mechanisms,
clear business goals, solid finan ces and the relatively strong
competitiveness internationally. (Hou Aiai 2002: 28)

The formal corporatization of, and limited iss uance of public share
capital by, the PRC banks, and th e adoption by th e banks of the formal institutions of modern corporate governance, must be understood
in view of the e other critically important contextual, financial, institutional, policy and regulatory reform , almo t all of which a re still
in process. Indeed man y of the change noted above impact directly
or indirectly on corporate governance reform at th e bank .6
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THE BIG FOUR AND A HALF
This chapter focuse on the limited effects of corporatization on the
Big Four state-owned commer ial banks. For these purpo es, the " Big
Four and a Ha lf" wi ll be ad dressed to includ e a fifth entrant, th e Bank
of Communication (Bo om) . This i not to ignore or dimini h the
sometimes very different and positive effects of corpora tization and
publi Ii ting at mailer or more independent national-scope commercial bank , or their regional banking cousins. In fact, corporatization
and then public Ii ting of hare was first directed at China's non-Big
Four and a Half commercia l banks w hich nonethele s enjoyed authority to do busines nationally .7 Instead, here we focus on corporate
governance reform at th e large t sta te-owned banking in titucions in
China, what were hi torically tare administrati ve department used
to funnel capita l under the planned economy. Thi is for rea ons of
pace but a l o because the corporate governance reform pr gra m
wa de igned (or adverci ed) a a strategy that wou ld contribute
to improvement of the ntire Chinese financial y tern, and mo t
importantly the dominant pace occupied by the Big Four and a Half.

NEW BOARDS - OLD CAPITAL STRUCTURES
The theory underlying corporatization and public Ii ting held that the
tran formed enterprises would take advantage of the corporate form
and provide a mechanism for interested shareholders-private, public,
or foreign-to hold management (directors and senior management)
accountable for operating results, and thus force them to make valueenhancing decision . Early Chinese theorist and policymakers infatuated with " hare y tern reform" and th e " modern enterpri e sy tern "
initially a serted that mere positioning of a sets under the umbrella
of a joint stock company legal form would magica lly "separate owner hip and management' and force managers to be accoun table in
the pur uit of profits for the owner of the firm, and be subject to
ongoing monitoring of any potentially opportuni tic or inefficient
beha vior th ey might otherwise be tempted to engage in. Io theory then,
corporatization- aod the establishment of a directorate/management
corp re pon ible to shareholder-owner -wa promoted a an
in rant pan acea for the lack of operational or allocative efficiency
at China' banks, not co mention a turdy defen again t manipulation of these firm by "insiders." The distribution of equity intere c to
a broader " public' resulting from access to th e international capi tal
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market , attendant information di losure bounded by pro pectu liability and the phenom non of a public market share price (and thu
ongoing eva luation of the true value of the banking firm) were a ll
thought to upport the urgently de ired monitoring and accountabi lity effect .
Each of the Big Four and a Half (except the gricultural Bank of
hina ( B )) ha e undertaken sligh tl y different program of orporati za tion a nd ub equent establishment of "modern' orporate
governance tru rure . All hare establishment of a Board of Director wa formally atop a corporate legal per on that ha a n ab olutely
dominant hareholder or group of shareholders. Bo om, the
ne
Half' in the Big Four and a Half and the first hine e bank to
effect an initial public offering (JPO), i a good
ample.
noted
in it 2005 Annual Report (and the ' Corporate Governance Report"
ontai ned therein), with corporatization and a public Ii ting allegedly
ame an ' independent and modern corporate tructure' compri ed
of the hareholders' meeting, th e Board of Direct r , and-as
required under th e German/Japan/faiwan-influen ed hine Co mpany Law-a upervisory board, all charged with performing 'check
and balance functions" (Bank of Communicati n Annu al Report
200 : 38 ). t the IPO the Board of BoCom initially consi red of 19
director , only four of which were e e utive director , with the othe r
15 non-e ecutive directors including the C RC-mandated one-third
five independent directors. The supervisory board had nine memb rs, and wa proclaimed to be re ponsible for monitoring th e Bank's
financial matter , and the action of the Board of Director and en ior
management. A the chairman of the board of BoCom aid in 2006:

ow at the board meetings all directors have observed the
utmost diligence in the process of carrying out their duties and
have expressed independent opinions with respect to matters
such as company strategy, audit and risk management. This is
perceived m ost directly by the fa ct that at board meetings
directors speak with vigor and disputes arising from the
deliberation of motions have become commonplace. It is very
different from the ' single voice carries all" (yi yan tang) of
before. (Hu Runfeng, Cheng Zhe, and Fu Tao 2006: 72)
Yet, even after corporatization and the Bank's successful IPO, more
than 40 % of it hare were held by a combination of the Mini try
of Finance, the ationa l Council for ocia l ecurity Fund (NCSSF),
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and Huijin (a joint venture between the PR central bank's foreign
exchange bureau and the Ministry of Finance, described in more derail
below). Add to tho e holdings the almost 20% Hong Kong hanghai Bank (H B ) trategic holding, and anoth er more than 20% held
principal ly by ' legal person' hareholders (most SO s such as the
Beijing apita l Airport Group Yunna n's Hongt a, handong Electric Power ompany, and o on), and the re ult wa an extremely
chin public float and rather badly situated group of public, collective
action-challenged, shareho lder . A second example, the far bigger
lndu trial and ommercial Bank of China (ICBC)-the last of the
large bank co IPO and the tru remnant of the pre-1994 PRC' monobank r rail level-pre ents a largely imilar picture. The (new) ICBC
was 'establi h d' (corporatized) by promotion (with Huijin and the
Ministry of Finance acting as promoter ) of a new company limited
by hare in October 2005. In January 2006, the ICB took foreign
trategi in ve tment from Goldman achs (5.16%)
llianz roup
(2.01 %) and the merican Expre
ompany (0.4 %) .9 The initial,
posr-IP
board tructure of the ICBC was made up of th irteen directors with four e ecuti ve directors, and six non-executive dire tors
(of which three were independent directo rs ). The governance input
by th e for ign " trategic" in ve tors in the ICBC wa left to a di fferent mechani m (at lea t in comparison with the other r formed PR
bank )-a " tra tegic ooperacion Agreement" with pre-IPO inve tor
oldman Sach . 10 Yet, even after the Bank's rather re o undingly ucce fol dual hanghai and Hong Kong dual-listing lPO, the capita l
tructur rema ined heavil y weighted in favor of bina' tate actors or
proxie with the M inistry of Fina nce Huijin an d th e · SSF h !ding
an aggregate f 79 .49 % of the issued and ou t tanding equi ty (ICB
2006: 188).

HUIJIN (CHINA SAFE INVESTMENT LIMITED)
n imp rtant player in the bala nce heet ame liora ti on and corporate r tru tu ring implica ted by reform wa Huijin, form a ll y r ndered
in Engli h a the "China SAFE lnve tment Limited. A PR limited
liabi lity compa ny jointly owned by the Mini try of inance and the
tat Ad mini era ti on of Foreign Exchange ( AF ), th e entity originally
acted a th e vehicle for reca pitalization of Chin a' major bank using
hina's e ploding foreign exchange re erve (ch central bank recapitalizing the banks with foreign exchange fund and u ing the newly
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e tabli hed Huijin a the nominal resulting shareholder/inve tor).
A th e Bank of China (BOC) stated in it IPO prospectu , the
function f Huijin wa ' to represent the PRC government in
exercising it investor rights and obligations" as a Bank sharehold r
and ' implement and execute PRC government policy arrangement in
relation to the reform of state-owned financial institution " (Bank of
China 2006: 197). The charge was erious, or far more eriou than
the mi ion of other ' tate (ministry) shareholder in China large
y tern of inefficient SOEs, refo rmed and unr formed (including the
ub equently e tablished ational omm1ss1on on anagemenr of
tate As ets (guoziwei)) As Premier Wen Jiabao said about Huijin 11
' [Huijin inve tment] i equity held on behalf of the rate, it hould
have a return, it hould not be used to repleni h deep hole !" (Ling
Huawei 2005: 74) . Staffed extremely thinly, and always subject to
infighting between the Ministry of Finance and the PB (which
govern AFE), the new entity ended up a a major shareholder
in hina' key financial institutions by virtue of the equity inve tment/capitalizarion tasks it performed. It narrow focu (the mmercial banking sector), its relatively few "inve tments " (the few tateowned banks it had been asked to recapitalize), and the e perti e
and dynamism of its senior per onnel led to its strong participation
a an interested shareholder in its inv stee bank -a participation
that ometime ran counter to the idea and ambition of it formal
masters (the Mini try of Finance and the PB / AFE), and the expectations of the bank insiders it now' governed" (Wen Yuanhua 2006:
7 ). Howe er it i seen or evaluated Huijin t od a an early and partial re olution of China's long randing "ab ent principal" quandary.
For mu h of the Reform period criti of both the OE y tern and
the ucceeding corporatization program lamented the fact th at there
was no real "principa l" to govern
E , leaving th e OE prey to
the in ider cadre /managers clo e t to the enterprise (Ho u iai 2002;
larke 2003; Dou Hongquan 2005). orporatization did not solve
thi quandary in any significant way, a the amorphou and und efined
former 100% owner-"all the people' (quamnin) -remained the primary "owner" of the transformed firms, now "owning" thr ugh the
rate's reduced 70- 80 % equity intere t. There was no pecific intere ted shareholder, but instead an "ab ent principal", o that even
corporatized firm were subje t to continuing control and manipulation by pre-exi ting management and in ider often the same people
in the ame role as when the banking firm was an SOE commercial
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bank. Huij in, at lea tin the limited world of China s commercial banking institution altered that deficiency with panache- and in a way
that initia ll y urpri ed and hocked in ider managers at the bank ,
and the prior representative of all the people," the Ministry of
Finance! 12
FOREIG N STRATEGIC INVESTMENT
Equall y important to th e corporate governance reform, at lea t in
theor wa the permitted presen e of 'foreign' strategic inve tor in
China re tructured bank . In the late 1990s, the PBC and then it
ucce or regulator the CBRC began to allow foreign minority quity
inve tment (le than 25% in the aggrega te} in certain of the non-Big
Four and a Half commercial bank and even those which had dome tic A- har li sting -starting with the troubled Shenzhen Development
Bank inve tment by ewbridge, an arm of the Texa Pacific Group
(now TPG) privat equity entity. A ubsequent deal by Citigroup
where it purcha ed a small strategic take in Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, repre ented a po sibly provocative innovation b cau
it permitted foreign trategic ( ame industry) investment rather than
merely financial (private equity or fund) inve tment in the conuner ial
banking se tor. 13 Fina ll y, in 2004-and again in direct anticipation
of hina ' large rate-controlled bank launching IPO on the int rnational marke t -the PRC began to permit foreign inve tment (both
trategic and financial) in the newly corporatized Chine e comm rcial bank . The e allowance were in many ways 1.ike simi lar pre-IPO
for ign trar gic investment in over ea -listing Chinese companie
in other ctor , from manufacturing (Anheu er-Bush' private purcha e f 5 % of pre-IPO H-share listing Tsingrao Brewery ompany
Limited) to natural re ource (BP, ExxonMobil' , and Warren Buffet' pre-IP private purchases of equity in Petro hina and inopec).
Howev r, th ere is one important difference between uch foreign
inve tment in pre-IPO Big Four and a Half commercial bank and
in other e tor . Foreign minority transactions in other ector , preIPO, were m ant to commun icate confid nee and randing to the
capital market and rarely wa there any question of uch foreign
minority participant -industry or not-b ing permitted an kind
of governanc input on the inve tee firm . onver el the pr -IP
minority purcha
by foreign inve tor in hina' Big Four and a Half
commer ia l bank -much like Citigroup' involvement in hanghai
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Pudong Development Bank and HSBC's investment in the Ba nk of
Communications-were explicitly billed as a channel through which
"modern" operational techniques and better corporate go ern ance
would be communicated to the target Chinese bank . Thu , each of
the PRC commercial banks that attracted foreign "strategic in vesto rs"
explicitly trumpeted the purported governance effect leaving
implicit the corporate finance/capital markets vote of co nfi dence:
BoCom highlighted the involvement of HSBC and H BC repre enration on the Banks Board of Directors (Bank of ommuni a ti ns
2005: 96); CB made much of its ties with Bank of America an d then
ingapore' Temasek, stating that the former would provid e help for
CCB in "risk management, corporate governance, credit card business, consumer banking, global treasury and inform a tion technology" (Ling Huawei, Guo Jiong and Li Zh.igang 2006: 49 ), and th at
both would be entitled to seats on the Bank's Board (C B 2005 : 88);
the BOC made exactly the same claims regarding the Ro ya l Ba nk
of Scotland and Temasek's involvement, the board eat promi ed
each, and entry into a 'Master Cooperation Agreement" with the
former (BOC 2006: 69), even though Royal Bank of Scotland has
no obligation to buy more of the Bank in the future (contrast the
Bank of America's stronger commitment (via an option agreement}
to CCB))· finally, the ICBC implicitly promi ed benign and penetrating involvement by Goldman Sach pur uant to the " tra tegic
ooperation Agreement' it signed with that underwriting firm a nd
th e variou 'joint committees" and governance training immediately
establi hed .

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM , BUT
UNREFORMED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
From inception , corporatization and public listings (and the existence of a public stock price) have been recognized a at be t, a
theoretical solution to the governance conundrum at hina's bank .
What were those " theoretical " impulses counseling corporatization
and listing of China's state-owned bank as a (partial) remedy for
the ector's ills? As the PBC Governor pointed out in 2005, much
of the rationale directing reform of the state-owned commercial
banks was equally applicable to thei_r borrower/cUent , the PR C's profoundly inefficient SOEs. In a hinese language interview responding
to the question , "Why did you choose corporatization and hare
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issu ance and listing as the reform direction for the state-owned commercia l banks?" and "What were you thinking at the time?' Zhou
responded:

At the time, our view was that the major reform problems
encountered by commercial banks and large SOEs were the
same, such as lack of separation between government and
enterprise, too much administrative interference, empty governance structures, a separation between the incentive structure
and cadre managers, serious bureaucratization, and lack of
autonomy or pricing authority, with not enough competitive
pressure . .. All of these issues are very similar to those faced
by large OEs that had conformed to the bureaucratic model
of management and did not resemble real enterprises . .. . As
a result we felt that-with respect to the choice we made
for state-owned commercial banks-we should refer to the
successful aspects of the industrial SOE reform and implement share system reform [corporatization] and public listings. {Ling Huawei 2005: 73)
The way to do that Zhou opined was to make the banks more
accountable to owner/shareholders (both a broad public, and trategic
inve tors). Thu , th e fir.st tep was necessarily co tran form the bank
into hareholding firms. In Zhou's view, this would bring only a mall
co tto the state, whi h wou ld agree to give up a tiny lice of equity (but
no real control) for the benefit of more competitive, profit-oriented
financi a l institution ab le to contribute to the growth of the hine e
national econo my, and the PRC's national ecurity and tability-all
th e while acting to curtail the terrible drain of ub idies and bailout of in olvent banking insti tutions (Ling Huawei 2005: 73) . Thu
th PR ' corporatization and public listing strategy had both the
hort-rerm benefit of attracting more capita l into China' reforming
bank to aid in the post-A ian Financial ri i recapita li zation, but
al o the long-term benefit of creating the mechani m and condition
for hea lthier better governed, and more efficient firms.
Legal analy t aid much the ame thing but focu ed on property
right legal identitie , and structural attributes.
one corporate
governance exp rt at hina People's Univer ity (Renda) Law S hool
ummarized in late 2002:

There are many aspects to the reasons creating the present
poor situation at the state-owned commercial banks; the
majority of commentators believe that the basic reason is a
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structural defect. Under the current structure, China's stateowned commercial banks are mere conduits for the implementation of certain government economic policies, and are
unique enterprises where the property rights form is unitary
(wholly state-owned) the delineation of property rights is confused, and the administrative and enterprise functions are not
separated. State-owned commercial banks are not enterprises
as understood under corporate law, and have never established mechanisms for risk management or that are designed
to create a pro-fit motivation. (Hou Aiai 2002: 27)

And yet, notwithstanding these noble ambition and even fin e theoretical viewpoints, corporatization coupled with public listings of the
largest state-owned Chinese commercial banks have not resulted in
any real corporate governance reform. Thi is not the ame a aying the PRC banks have not shown improved performance which is
a separate question. Instead, it expresses the lack of any connection
between thoroughgoing structural legal reform and better firm governance. Some of the reasons for this are de cribed in the fo ll owing
sections:
CAP ITAL STRU CTURE
POST-CORPORATIZATION ; POWERLESS
FOREIGN EQUIT Y INVEST O RS

otwithstanding corporatization, and even a China's banks moved
from the afest corporate form (the "wholly state owned corporation"
sub-genus of the limited liability corporation form) to formation as
joint stock companies, the resulting capital tructure of China' banking in titutions remains overwhelmingly dominated by tate or tatebacked hareholders. Thi alway wa the program-to corporatize,
recapitalize, and list (with the public issuance of shares acting primarily in the service of recapitalization), and yet to continue to allow state
shareholders dominant ownership and ab olute control in the banking firm. A Z hou Xiaochuan wrote in the Renmin Ribao (Peop le's
Daily) in May 2000:
.. . Commercial banking is not a sector where there is a need
for 100% state ownership. Large-scale commercial banks
have a major effect on the national economy, and yet the
state's power to control can be embodied through [relative] equity control. . . . In order to preserve the state's full
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control power and preserve protection against external shocks
in the period of opening to the outside world [and foreign
competition] and economic system conformity [with international structures}, the state can maintain absolute control
ovel' a certain portion of the large-scale commercial banks;
for instance, [the state] can keep a 75% equity interest. (Zhou
Xiao chuan 2000: 76)

Ir hould be em phasized here that the problem is not that the dominating hareholder is th e state or a state representati ve, but instead
that any ingle shareholder (or shareholder group) holds a dominating interest in the firm and i able to elect its own personn el to the
Board of Director , with tho e directors in turn appointing the same
personnel to the top management level. The fact th at Huijin-and
more importantly, the directors elected by Huijin-took an activist
and unprecedented involvement in those of th e Big Four and a Half
to which they donated foreign exchange in exchange for equity was
in man y ways an unanticipated exception.
The net resu lt of the bank ' post-restructuring architecture was to
create corporate vehicles where minority shareholders have almost
nil governance input, and little ability to condition the behavior and
strategy of the co ntrolling shareholder, much less the insiders th e
controlling shareholder formally appoints. Of course, " independent
director ' (du li do ngshi) mandated for public companies in China
are supposed to serve the interests of the firm's minority investors.
This is a difficult task to perform, especia lly when such independent directors have a basic duty to act in the interests of the entire
firm (surely synonymous with the interests of the 80 % shareholder),
no negative veto at the board level (a nd th.us an inability to hinder
decisions pres ed by the majority of board directors who represent
the largest state hareholder), and are often nominated from the sa me
pool of Party in iders discussed below. Thu , while the new legal
form of China' banks in theory leads to better governance of the firm
(with "owners" now monitoring the way in which 'their" as ets are
employed by th eir elected board and board-a ppointed 'managers"),
the lop ided and only incidentaUy 'state '-dominated capital structure of all of China's banks effectively sets up a whole new menu of
agency dil emma -where true minority shareholder have no power
to monitor or change director fiduciaries, and are completely left
out of monitoring the huge majority contro l block that appoints th e
majority of the board of directors. Thi is now increasingly recognized
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a deeply problematic even in Chinese language writing on commercial bank reform (Dou Hongquan 2005: 275-314).
The chairman of the board of the ICBC made just thi point in a
pre-IPO interview at the inception of corporatization . Minimizing the
importance of the Board of Directors as an in tirution, or the effect
of corporatization and a public listing for some of the firm's hare ,
Jiang Jianqing said:
I must specify here that the historical problems created for
state-owned banks are not due to a lack of board of directors, but are instead closely connected to multiple factors such
as China's economic structure, credit structures, reorganization of state-owned enterprises and the transitional economy,
etc . ... /W]e recognize that we must carry out shareholder
rights reform, but that is not our ultimate goal. Nowada ys,
many people very mechanically think that solving [shareholders' rights] is everything and, once that happens, bank
reform will have succeeded. In reality, simultaneously with
shareholder rights reform, we must also strengthen the bank 's
internal corporate governance . .. . It is not the case that once
we resolve our listing, then everything will be "OK." (Ling
Huawei and Zhao Xiaojian 2003: 74)

In a djfferent but eq ually detrimenta l way th e lop ided capital
tructure of China 's state-controll ed commer ial bank make any
market for corporate control irrelevant to the management of the
banking firm in vo lved. It is genera ll y accept d that if ub- tandard
management results in sub-par finan cial performance that will be
reflected in a declining share price. Thar declining share price
wou ld-in a deeper and more liquid capital market for the shares
of a specific firm-re sult in an attempted takeover by a poten tiall y
more efficient or well-run concern, happy co buy the undervalued
equity, replace management and/or in ider , and increa e va lue of the
underperforming firm in the future . Yet where on ly a limited amount
of the shares are actually trul y in play, an d ontrol is firm ly stuck
in the hands of one acto r (in hina , the rate acting through th e
Ministry of Finance), such firm -and the firm ' man agers- are completely insulated from any such threat to ontrol. In thjs context, even
if a declining share price ignal bad ma nagement, and leads to discomfort in managem ent ranks, it doe not carry with it the threat of
takeover and restructured management (that is, loss of po t).
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As an alternative spur to improved corporate governance many
observers and analysts also point to the introduction of foreign
minority equity inve tment (often accompanied by foreign governance
input a nd "strategic" or "technical" assistance), or the competitive
effects of Chi na fulfilling its WTO commitments in the sector, as critical if not determinative factors in the reform of China's commercial
bank (Berger, Ha an, and Zhou 2007). 14 Thi chapter reject , or at
least eks co de-emphasize, the purported beneficial effects of foreign
equity participation inside China' large t commercial banking enterprise for much the ame rea on that imple corporatization and public listing i no improvement: it doe not dislodge the overwhelming
power of the 70-80% hareholder and the insider who are appointed
as it (thei r) repre entative . While uch foreign strategic investor may
offer bu ine and operational in ights or suggestions for new product lin e , and may even have" trategic cooperation" agreement that
appear ro allow for significant input, the fact is that-without negotiated negative veto right -they have no power to enforce dissenting
view , block in ider action, much le effectively moniror insider or
th e large state equity holding . To date, there seem to be only one
working example of foreign 'strategic' inve tor governance input at a
Chine e banking firm-and that is TPG's buy-out of state ( henzhenlevel) hare holder at the widely held Shenzhen Development Bank.
Th degree of foreign trategic investor control in thi one example
i a result of unique circumstances: the "exit" of rate hareholders
(bo ught out by the foreign invesrors), the widely held shares (mostly
publi ), an d a c ntral government-approved management arrang ment assur ing a minority hareholder extra-proportional board-level
governance and e ecutive officer appointment power .

PARTY COMMITTEES-THE EMPEROR'S
NEW CLOTHES
ft is no secret that while corporatized and newly Ii red hine e
commercial bank have establi hed formal "Board of Director "
(which mu t now include a required proportion of ind pendent
direcror ), and further et up specifi committee of the Board , there i
another 'committee' that exercises deci ive influence over governance
of the bank and the directors who are-in law-the centralized management ape of the bank. Thi comm ittee is widely di cu ed in
hine e writings and journali m about the corporatized commercial
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bank , but rarely referred to in foreign language writing journalism, or off bore listing offering documents. 15 It i the Committee of
the Chine e ommuni t Party that i established in all transformed
SOEs (and even in the a uthor' s experience, township and village
enterpri es (TVE ) that have corporatized and sought public listing ).
Thus, notwith tanding the importation of the mechanism that corporate law ana lysts de cribe as a ' Board of Directors ', th e real power in
any of China large state-owned commercial banks-and the group
that largely appoints (by nomination for election by the shareholder ,
the hareholders dominated by the approximately 70% ' tate shareholder which acts according to the instructions of the Party sy tern)
and direct the directors-is th e Party Committee. The Parry ommittee in any bank or other SOE is in turn subj ect to control by the
Party sy tern (as contrasted with the state and military), with appointments to enterpri e-level Party committees governed by Party per onnel appointment . In the cases of all the PRC corporatized commercial
banks, Big Four and a Half or not, the only evidence of thi para llel Party organization in such banks' offering document and public
report i m ention of the "Discipline Committee" or sometimes even
" Party Discipline Committee." This is a committee ubordina te to
the Party Committee in each bank that investigates and punishe bad
actor in the bank qua Party members pursuant to Party ' di cipline"
(distinct fro m "public " legal or regulatory enforcement). one of the
PRC tate-controlled banks that have gone publi explicitly a lludes
to the exi tence of such Party com mittee . In tead mo t public offering d cuments-in the ection re ponding to m a ndatory di clo ure on
" Management"-awkwa rdly name a ingle individual who i leader
of the " Di cipline Committee," but without further elaboration on
what exactly such Discipline Committee is or does, th e way in which
it is subordinate to a Party Committee, or how such ommittee relates
to the formal corporate governance structur s. 16
In a remarkably forthright 2006 interview, the chairman of
BoCom Jiang Chaoliang de cribe what th Party ommittee does
why it does it, and who or what it is deem ed to represent. Perhaps
mo t startling, from the standpoint of orthodox corporate governance practices, i the turn ed-around tatement of Chairman Jiang,
apparently trying to rea ure his interviewer a to the real locu of
control in the banks. Jiang say that "when the board of director disagrees with the opinion of the Party ommittee, the former can veto [the Committee's deci ion] " (Hu Runfeng, heng Zhe,
and Fu Tao 2006: 72). This i the preci e opposite of what the
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corporate form as it has developed since the nineteenth century, and
not incidentally the PRC Company Law since 1994, promises: centralized management vested in the Board of Directors, subject to very
high threshold checks on board power by (1) specialized board committees, or (2) the shareholders. Jiang conversely reveals a corporate law and governance regime that locates primary power in the
hands of an undisclosed Committee-which is none of the Board
of Director , senior management upervisory board, or sharehold ers meeting-and then allows a Board of Directors-in law, the ole
legal fiduciarie of the firm owners-a mere "veto" over the propo al of the ame leading group. Jiang is more interesting in di cussing
the theoretical (and ideological) tie between the majority shareholder
(the state) the Party that rands behind the state, and the intere ts
served by the Party Committee in hina's new corporate governance
regime:
What does the Party Committee govern? First, it is in charge of
overseeing strategy. The government has a [sic] 65% interest
in Bank of Communications and, as the controlling shareholder it has the power to propose strategic arrangements
for the future development of the Bank. Second, [the Party
ommitteej oversees human resources . .. The Party Committee recommends to the Board of Directors senior management candidates with the Board of Directors making the final
decision . ... Third, [the Party Committee/ oversees corporate
social responsibility. Both natural and legal persons within
hina must undertake a certain amount of social responsibility such as lawfully paying taxes, operating business in
accordance with law and not being lawless and chaotic. If
the nation implements macroeconomic measures, [th e Bank]
must abide by these policies. (Hu Runfeng, Cheng Zhe and
Fu Tao 2006: 72)

There are everal fascinating aspect to the e comments. Mo t important are those which depart from an orthodox und r randing of the
legal or operational relationship between the ro les of vario u actor
in the corporation: (1) acknowledgement that the tate i the controlling sharehold er in the bank but that the tare's inc re t, qua
shareho lder, is communicated not through the shareholders meeting
but via the firm-level Communist Party ommittee, and the Party
Committee's proposals are communicated directly to the Board of
Directors; (2) the Party's direct respon ibility and authority for
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selecting and proposing sen ior management of the firm (albeit ubject
to approva l by the Board of Directors); 17 and (3) the clear indication
chat the Party Committee (exercising authority through th e Board of
Director and the Board's appointed officers) will cause the firm not
to act in the direct profit-making interest of all the shareholder but in
accord with "stability," 'lawfulness," and national "macroeconomic
meas ures." Finally, Jiang reveals in the same 2006 interview how the
Party Committee- at least at the Bank of Communications-in fact
exercise it writ:
[The Bank 's] Party Committee represents the interest of our
largest shareholder and submits to the Board of Directors
certain proposals. After the Board votes its approval, the
senior management is assigned to implements [them]. When
the management implements them, the supervisory board
oversees whether the Board's strategic direction and senior
management's implementation are lawful. (Hu Runfeng
Cheng Zhe, and Fu Tao 2006: 72) 18

Here, it is clear that the shareholder interest is not represented or
articulated by the shareholders' meeting, but by the Party Committee, which it should be noted has no fiduciary duty in law to th e
shareholder ' it i said to act for.
The BOC's president, Li Lihui wa equally forthright about the
function of the Party Committee at the BOC in a 2005 interview,
although he hades the is ue somewhat differently. After a Caijing
Magazine reporter relayed a joke to Pre idem Li 19 the Pre idem,
BOC, responded:
At present, some members of the board of directors, supervisory board and senior management are Party members. Th e
Chairman [of the board} is the Party Committee Secretary,
and head of the Supervisory Board and the President are ViceSecretaries of the Party Committee. Th e [Party} Committee
is to monitor macro-policy, firm direction, Party structure, as
well as the structure of the Party membership, and monitor
coordination among different departments. In China, it is very
important to employ the political power of the Communist
Party. Management arrangements can solve a majority of the
problems, but not all of them. For example, if asked how to
develop political ideology work or how to increase employees'
ethical standards, and so on-these issues must be studied by
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the Party Committee. So, I think there is nothing hypocritical [about this/. [Or, on the question of what to do with]
220,000 employees: lay them off, or undergo restructuring?
(Zhang Xiaocai 2005)
imilarly, ICB Pre ident Yang Kaisheng invokes the role of
th e Party Committee as an undisclosed part of the governance
structure, saying in 2006: "Since October 2005, Industrial and
ommercial Bank ha changed its system to 'Three Committee
[meaning enior management, the Board of Directors, and the
up rvi ory board]- Four ommittee ' if the Party Committee i
included-operational tate" (Zhang Jiwei, Yu ing and Guo Jiong
2006: 66 ).
Li and Yang' comment are as revealing as Jiang' , and demon crate both the contin ued existence and huge role of the undi do ed
Party
ommittee ("macro-policy, firm direction .. . coordination
among different d partment ' ) its indispen able nature (" management arrangement can olve a majority of the problems, but not all of
them "), and th e intimate cro s-relationships between nomenklatura
posts and formal corporate posts (board chairman = Party ecretary, supervisory board chairman = Party vice-secretary, president=
Party vice-secretary, and o on) that mimic o clo ely the relation hip
between the Party and rate organs more broadly.
Thi identification of the Party Committee's significant role i not
meant to cast asper ion on the Chinese Communi t Party, or the fact
that chi often undi closed center of governance power i specifically
a ommuni t Party committee. instead, it onJy erves to highlight
th e tru e location of corporate authority in Chinese banks (and other
firm ), and the eparation between form and function in Reformera hina. Mo t importantly, it indicates that incentivization of, r
ace untability for director or sen ior management will never be terri bly relevant when uch per on are not the real directing power of the
firm; moreover, th e real power behind the firm are not monitored by
the hareholder at all, but instead by a eparate and uperior Parry
organiza tion.
THE NOMENKLATURA STAYS IN THE GAME
A Bo om Chairman of the Board (and not incidentally ommunist Party Committee ecretary) Jiang haoliang make clea r in the
interview quoted above, the Party organization (acting through th e
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firm-level Party Committee) has the pre-eminent role in actually
appointing enior management (many of whom do double duty as
executive director ):
... [the Party ommittee] oversees human resources . . .. The
Party Committee recommends to the Board of Directors
senior management candidates with the Board of Directors
making the fina l decision . . . (H u Runfeng Cheng Zhe, and
Fu Tao 2006: 72)

Who are the e individuals appointed to senior management posts?
The great majority of them are personnel who have randing in the
Communist Party hierarchy (as determined by the per onnel appointment system), often in the sa me "system" (xitong) a the releva nt
firm but not always. Even in Reform-era China, all OE and statecontrolled enterprises remain a part of (or subject for) the Party
ranking sy tern th at embraces all public institution . Nomenklatura
appoi ntments continu e for public enterprises a they do for administrative unit, only "one level down ." The power to appoint individual
departm ent and enterprise leaders throughout the public ector is one
of the mo t important vehicles for Chinese ommuni t Party control of all aspect of ociery and the political e onomy (Lieberthal
2004: 234-9). Thu , corporate management appointment are almost
entirely informed by and shadow, Party tructur arrangements
and career eval uation. Said another way enior corporate elections
(director and upervi ory board member ) and appointments (management) only reflect arrangements an imated entir ly by the continuing PRC nomenklatura ystem.
Thus it is common to see significant firm leader moved between
corporate and government (Parry) function ; for exam ple, the chairman of China National Offshore Oil Corporation moved next to the
Governorship of Hainan Province, CCB's ucce or to the disgraced
Zhang Enzhao transferred in from the PB (SAFE), and the new boss
of Sinopec parachuted in from a senior politica l post in northeast
China . More disorienting is the frequent interchange of enior figures
in the nomenklatura between even competing furn in the ame industry, a kind of musical chairs pl ayed not ju tat th e very highest level,
but at the operational level a well. For example
me eyebrows were
raised when apparent "competitors" China Mobile and China Unicom switched highe t ranking executive immediately after they had
both completed international IPOs. As another exam ple, during the
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summer of 2007-and in the period of a mere five days- a large- cale
swap of high-level operational-level per onnel (Deputy CEO level )
between apparent competitors hina Mobile, China Telecom, China
etcom, and China Unicom wa completed. 20 Each of the companie involved is ued press release announcing the changes, and it
was widely put out that the apparently distinct firms were preparing for 3G bids. Yet these exec utive re huffles reveal that the e four
firms are ubject to some other, non-firm-specific, approach. That is
the nomenklatura system, which assigns senior government official
among Party organs and government departments-even government
department that have been corporatized as a way to raise capital on
the international and domestic markets.
The e apparently PRC- pecific phenomena need not be ca~se for
objection on p litical or organizational grounds . Who i to ay that
the Parry (acting through the tare, which is the large t shareholder
in such firm ) may not to as ign it most competent cadres to difficult ta k at the nation mo t complex political-economic organizations? Certainly appointment of purely political personnel to manage
increasingly technical tasks (such as those seen in the financial ector)
are ill-advi ed although the degree of intrusion by pure nomenklatura
appointments in commercial and operational aspects of firm activitie
probabl y varie from SOE to SOE. However, it is a econd reminder
a to how much at variance governance arrangements are with formal appearance bestowed by enterprise reform and corporatization.
Mo t importantly, it identifie who precisely is being monitored and
held accountable in China's banks, and by whom. It is not-a the
corporate f rm might make us think-directors and senior officers
held accountab le to shareholders. In tead, China's bank (and oth r
SOE ) evid nee nomenklatura accountable t the Party y tern, the
am y t m that govern the nominal controlling hareholder of the
bank : the tate.
GOVERNING AN OCTOPUS

Aside from the problematic capita.I tructure in place after corporatization, and th e persistence of a powerful shad w governance y t m, and
thu ev n if manager were inspired to govern hine e banking firm
in th intere t of all of the shareholder the sheer ize di pa rate organization and continuing independence of branch-level actor nominally under hina' banking firms a t to defeat th effort. Fore ample at its IPO, BoCom had 92 branche only e en f whi h were
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directly monitored by the "head office" (corporate headquarters) .
Twenty- even of tho e branches were "provincial-level" branche ,
which in turn monitored 58 other branches from the provincial level
(Bank of Communications Annual Report 2005: 22). At CB, President Chang Zhenming identified the vertical governance difficulties
a critical:
Originally, the model for operating the whole bank was by
having 38 tier-1 branches, each with their own balance sheet,
and then aggregation of [net] profits of each branch making up
the [gross] profits [revenues] of the head office. o, the management style of the head office was to distribute all resources
to the 38 tier-1 branches. (Ling Huawei, Guo Jiang and
Li Zhigang 2006: 48)

Similarly, at its IPO, the BOC had over 11,000 branches and
outlets, 580 self-service centers, and 11,600 automated service
machines (BOC 2005: 120); the ICBC topped all competitor , boasting 18,038 ' domestic branches, outlets, and other establishments"
in June 2006, and 98 "overseas branches, subsidiaries, representative
offices, and outlets"! (ICBC 2006: 102)
Chinese banking institution are in fact very difficult to integrate
vertically, as the "head office (and now orporate cent r) i often
akin to a rather weak and latter-day federal government with anemic
command or monitoring power over the activities of long pre-existing
ub idiary departments. The rea on for thi i do ely related to the
key problem in Chinese governance generally: loca l (provincial or
municipal level and down) identities of bank branches are closely
tied to their equivalent level of government (and Party), and very
often pre-date the existence of anything like a " head office." As
PRC economist Wu .Jinglian noted in late 2005, until the mid-1990
branch-level actors had actually received funding direct from locallevel PRC Central Bank offices, which they on-lent t local customer
(Economist 2005: 73). Thus, for example, the Chongqing Municipal
system of branches of a given state-owned bank will almost certainly
be more responsive to the priorities and ambitions of the Chongqing
Municipal People's Government (and Party organization) than the
commands of that same bank' nominal headquarter or the "head
office" of the fictional legal person th at ha been made the summit of its formal legal structure after corporatization. Many local
level "branches" will make their own loan origination and asset
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creation decisions, implement their own credit standards (under pressure from th e local, equ iva lent, level of government) and even prepare
their own sta nd-alone, fina ncia l ta temen t . This was recognized very
early in China financial sector reform, in November 1997, when th e
ational Financial Working Group repeatedly issued policy command exhorting local governmen ts not to interfere with the operation and deci ion-making of their co-equal bank branches (Zhou
Xiaochuan 2000: 76) . onre mporary observers know that this
dynamic remain in play, not imply because many ' loca l" bank
leader respond in thi way to their nominal superiors but beca use
so many of the ignificant bank candals in the past decade have
their origin in difficu lt to monitor local-level opera ti on .21 A one
foreign executive who parachuted into the chairman hip of the henzhen Development Bank a the repre entative of TPG said : "Branch
manager are king in hina ' (Economist 2005: 73) .
Even after restructuring and formal imposition of mandated monitoring and enforcement pr cedures, it is very difficult for the enior
levels of any PR bank pread aero s a huge physical and political
geography, to govern technicall y subordinate ystem . For example,
after it IPO the B C it elf di covered and revealed a ma ive fraud
at the henqiu branch in April 2006 (bank employee had conspired
with th e gen ral manager of local company Zhoukou Wanyuan Beer
to embezzle RMB146 milli.on between 2004 and 2005). The genesis of the fra ud ? The importance to th e loca l government of th e
enterpri e con piring with the local bank branch! As one local re idem said, "the government i very supportive of Wanyuan, but bank
credits a lon are imply not able to sari fy its appetite [for capital] ."
A a BO manager in Shenqiu admitted, " In 2005, Bank of China
initiated re tructuring an d the Bank aggre ively implemented internal control but th e power [of the Bank head office] to implement
th em at the Branch level is not great. T he branch manager ca n till
control vario u re ources within the branch and create in rability
due to the act of collusion to commit fraud . In reality, the BOC'
per onnel re trictions and rotational system [of per onnel appointment ] have only been implemented recently" (Hu Runieng, Yu ing,
and Guo Ji ong 2006: 41 ). This institutiona l reality must be taken
into account when aoa ly ts an d reformer po it th at more acco untable central corporate managers will be ab le to affect governa nce at
sub idiary levels of what are in fact diffu e and non-re pon ive
institutional structures. That in ight doe not even que tion the
extent to which local-level, branch actors are qualified to und erta ke
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commercial banking tasks-as CCB's newly installed chairman Guo
Shuqing noted in the run-up to that bank's international IPO, " more
than 90 % of the CCB's ri k managers are unqualified " (Eco nomist
2005: 73) . This difficult dynamic is only confirmed by the persi tence
of plainly bad, or perhaps just politicized, lending made by China's
large commercial bank , whereby so-called NPLs continue apace even
as past NPLs are removed from banking firms' books by "sa le" to
asset management companies, or covered by recapitaliza tion . No
doubt the new leaders of China's corporatized and public banks are
making real efforts to "re-centralize" (in many cases, a misnomer,
as power was originally vested in local identities of the in titutions)
the massive and widely disparate "branch" networks. o doubt
some of the more obvious abuses-branches operating autonomously,
creating their own websites, claiming independent legal per on (and
accounting) status, and so on-are being identified and eliminated.
Yet it seems that the chances for success of "centralization" and rectification will be hampered in the same way as the Chinese central
government's effort to re-centralize political and developmental control commencing in the mid-1990s.
TOO BIG TO FAIL

Finally, and notwithstanding all manner of organizational changes
wrought on the Big Four and a Half bank , there i a cl ear recognition
in the PRC and abroad that-no matter how badly run the banks may
be-they wi ll simply nor be allowed to fail. This results in a classic
'moral hazard" problem, at lea t for the individual actually governing the commercial banks. The world-shaking consequence of any
banking failure in China are not difficult to conjure. The desire nor to
allow China's banks to fail ha been adequately signaled by China'
central government and financial policymakers, and the eries of
recapitalizations and balance sheet re rorarion (effected via the likely
deferred recapitalizations that are the NPL transfers to a sec management companies) enjoyed by China's state banking sector. If indeed
the banks are too important to fail, then management-the ubject
of corporate governance attention-may be permitted to escape any
kind of acco untability for their deeds and mi deeds, no matter the
formal institutions of corporate governance app lied to them. (The
ame of course might be said for many of the West's large financial
institutions, especially in the context of the subprime mortgage loan
mess and the resulting global financial cri i , or the prior Savings and
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Loan scandal in the US. However, those markets maintain other, real,
measures of accounta bility and monitoring mechanisms, such as the
market for corpora te control.)

MEASUREMENT DEFICIT-SOARING STOCK
PRICES AND PERSISTENT NPLs
Any corporate governance cheme seeks to improve external monitoring and internal check and balances so as to bring about better
performance at the firm and increase shareholder value. With respect
to China s banking institutions, there are several ways in which the
pecific effect of corporatizacion and corporate governance reform
might be isolated and even measured. These include: increased profitability (fun damental change in the operations of the firm), decrease
in provi ion for PLs alon gside growth of high-quality bank asset
(again, fundamenta l change in the central operations of a bank, or
credit decisio n-making), and change in the public stock price (market
eva luation of bank profitability, growth and future value). Unfortunately in the current context of China's financial sector, each of these
traditi o nal mea uring devices is problematic.
It is till too early to use basic profitability or change in profitability, to mea ure the purported beneficial effe t of corporate governanc reform at hina' bank . This is true regardle of what meaure is u ed: return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), interest
rate margins, or even loan income to total revenues ratios. The rea on behind this difficulty is easy to understand : China ha only very
re enrl y corporatized its bank (and made into an independent lega l
per on, much le a n independent accounting unit)-thu , it i impo sible to und erstand 'change " (that is, improvement) in profitability
and performance a against any even recent baseline. In add ition, as
with the eva luation of continuing NPLs origination or carrying and
notwith ran ding the public disclosures required of four of the Big Four
and a H alf, th ere must be some continuing doubt a to the accuracy
of fin ancial reporting by the banks. While many ob erver hope that
beneficial change will be identified using this metric it i imply too
early try to understand the relationship between corporate governance
reform (not to mention regulation, public monitoring, and o on) and
improved performance.
A second metric that might be useful in eva luating how manager at
Chinese banks are doing in the new era, a ide from profit performance
or market evalu ation (via price) is th e continuing incidence of PLs.

150

China's Emerging Financial Markets

In the new age for listed Chinese banks, they are now forced to disclo e (often ) audited financial reports th at should describe with greater
accuracy (a nd under the di cipline of pro pectus liability) PL or
at least re erve against such PLs. Without over-generalizing, an d
yet taking eriously the occasional comments on thi s critical question
by Liu Minkang Chairman of the CBRC, it would seem that China's
banks-and e pecially the Big Four and a Half-have ontinued to
accumulate NPL or, aid another way have continued a firm
to make bad lending (asset creation) decisions. Thi worrying phenomenon has been described in the Chinese and foreign literature
(Economist 2005), and i the reason why at least one high profile
transaction (TPG's initial purchase of tate and legal per on share
from Shenzhen Municipal shareholders in Shenzhen Development
Bank) alm ost collapsed .22 One prominent report in the New York
Times detailed how a senior risk advi or hired by th e CB prior
to its IPO wa ignored by management when he per i ted in warning that 'bad loans were being hidden at th e bank 's branches in the
"special mention " category, erroneou ly la beled as good loans, even
though company records showed that they were impaired " (Barboza
2006) . Or, a one of the CBRC's own top officials said, explaining
why bad loan levels are not accurately revealed, "When our banks
di clo e information, they don t alway do o in a totally hone t manner " (Econom ist 2005: 72). For present purpo es the phenomenon is
important because it place in doubt the ro y reports i ued by China'
banks to the effect that-after corporatization, public li sting, and corporate governance reform-the growth of PLs ha been curtailed or
even that PL are decrea ing. At thi point, ob erver really have no
idea how the far-flung and difficult to govern PR bank are faring,
and thus no way to connect the formal changes seen in governance
and any effect in operation .
Implicit in any corporate governance cheme is th e idea that public tock price , even in a mildly efficient capital market , will reflect
ome idea of the value of the firm (a nd most importantly the market's perception of the performance of firm manag rs) . The prices of
public equity of Chinese tare-controlled bank before the 2008 global
era h both on oversea exchange and a th PRC banks do follow-on
A- hare offerings increasingly on dome tic exchanges probably
reflected enthusiasm for hina dizzyi ng growth trajectory and all
"China plays ' generally, rather than any evaluation of how a specific
firm is being run. After May 2006 all thin gs "Ch in ese" and "securities" were hot, if not overheated. ven before the current boom
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environment economi t tephen Green pointed to one "stock market
with Chine e characteri tic ' phenomenon: publicly listed Chine e
industrial concerns th at disclo e negative earnings, or even in ider
fraud or manipulation, and see their stock price increase! (Green
2003: 118-53) Much the same dynamic was at work with China'
bank stock , an d especia lly in the frame of China's "bubble" tock
mark ets and their irrational a cendance after the ummer of 2006. In
the commercial banking ector a good indication of the decoupling of
market price from even disclosed facts was the arrest of CCB Chairman Zhang Enzhao immediately before that bank's IPO and international Ii ting. Zhang wa replaced by a high-level rate bureau rat
(Guo huqing) hortly before the IP · the episode wa duly di lo ed
in the IPO, and yet the offering went off with a re ounding ucce s
and the Bank share price ha continued to climb. Much the same can
be een in the cream of horrifying di closures about operations at the
other bank and the lack of reaction in the share price of the i uer . In
hort all of the four in titutions with li tings, domestic and foreign in
the Big Four and a Half aw their share price rise steadily, eemingly
imperviou to firm- pecific information sector "fundamenta l " or
even broader market gyrations. Again what was actually at work
here i not difficult to ee: both foreign and PRC inve tor were
inve ting in banking in titutions that promise to era k hina 's
tartlin g growth, with little regard to pr sent governance of the pecific firm. (The recent ma ive declines are equally non -firm p cific
and tied to a global collap e of the equity and credit market .) The
implicati n of this continuing dynamic i that policymaker who
advocat d public Ii ting (and allegedly reflective public hare
price ) for hinese banks a part of a modern corporate governanc and public market monitoring regim e were p rhap mi taken in the hort term-the prices of hina bank co k d
n t, gen rally, reflect any e aluation of firm - pecifi management or
governance.
In um it i difficult-at lea t in the medium term-to mea ure
preci ely what effect the corporatization and corporate governance
reform pr gram have had, or will have, on China' banking in titu tion in term of making those institutions better and more effi ient
and profitable. Jc i important to re-empha ize chat the for going doe
not meant co deny that China's commercial bank have not improved
performance ince bank- pecific reform commenc d. The problem
i that it i till very difficult co determine whech r or not, and to
what e tent, improvements in performance have
urred and nigh
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impossible to specifically tie such improvements, if they exi t, with
change in the corporate governance structures of the banking in titutions them elves.
WHAT HAS CORPORATIZATION, PUBLIC
LISTING, AND STRATEGIC FOREIGN
INVESTMENT ACCOMPLISHED?

The foregoing ets forth the following proposition : (1) China
ha undertaken a wide-ranging reform of its state banking ector;
(2) one part of that reform program involved corporatization of the e
banking institutions the public listing of a portion of the banking
firm' post-corporatization share capital, and the implementation of
formal corporate governance mechanisms; (3) corporatization and
public listings were meant to create shareholder "principal ' eparate from director/executive management "agents", with th e former
monitoring and holding accountable the latter through board elections and fiduciary duty constraints; (4) notwithstand ing appearances,
China's state-owned commercial banks are still governed-at least at
the central level-in a relatively unchanged manner, with a Communi t Party Committee acting as the paramount authority in regards
to overall strategic direction and directorate/executive appointments;
(5) the ommunist Party and the nomenklatura personnel appointed
to directors and executive position are not nece sarily re pon ive to
the hareholders' interest (other than the 75% shareholder, the tate,
which i it elf directed by the Party); and (6) corporate re tructuring
and public listings of China's bank may--contrary to ex ante theoretical formulations-have had very little effect on governan e at the
ame firms.
Faced with these assertions, some may be forgiven for uttering the po ibly heretical view that corporatization, public Ii ting
lega l change, and corporate governance reform are without any effect
whatsoever in the Chinese financial sector. The reason for this-if it
i true-are as argued above: real and effective corporate governance
reform has not been visited on China' large banks, precisely because
the capital structu re remains so unbalanced, and because the Board
of Directors i th e centralized management of the firm in name only,
and the management (Board and senior officers) is in reality responsible to a Party Committee for the large state shareholder that was in
place long before corporatization. In corporate governance terms, the
powerful Party ommittee i comprised of the specific group of

China's Restructured Commercial Banks

153

" insiders" who control the firm in the absence of a real, autonomous,
watchful, principal/shareholder: the state (or 'all of the people").
(The assertive posture of Huijin, prior to its announced absorption
into CIC, was the momentary exception to this negative dynamic. )
Those insiders are not held accountable to either shareholders or the
market (via a market for corporate control). While it remains to be
seen if a system of private attorneys-general (and thus aggressive public shareholder monitoring via class action-style lawsuits) will grow
in China, uch a development seems doubtful given the inability of
shareholders to be organized a a true cost-spreading "class," and the
fact that the lawyers seeking to represent them cannot take cases on a
contingency ba i .23
One obviou long-term answer to this specific set of quandaries is increa ed (real) privatization of China's large, state-owned,
banks-not 'radical hock' privatization, or sale of control of the
banks to a replacement group of (non-state) insiders, but a gradual
selling down of the state's overw helming equity interest in individual
banks and to more independent and widely dispersed groups of capital: group intimately concerned with increasing performance (and
thus value) at the firms. Of course, there are huge social costs and
uncertainties attendant with even gradual privatization, regardless of
the sector implicated, costs that may dissuade the most aggressive
reformers. Add to that the extreme sensitivity of the nation' financial
sector, which till meets the overwhelming amount of capital allocation burden in China's fast-growing economy, and the chances for
accelerated privatization appear dim. Given th e small likelihood of
real privatization or dispersal of ownership, we might then ask more
intensively what real governance effects the partial program implemented to date has had, or at least promises over the medium term?
Put bluntly, is there anything about the corporate and legal change
visited on China's banks that might heighten accountability of bank
managers (whoever they are) and/or act as a check on opportuni tic or oppressive practices? It is in this regard that the true power
relationships inside China's albeit formally corporatized and publicly
reporting bank furn play a perhaps unanticipated role and one that i
po ibly unique in the short history of corporate governance reform.
We have noted above that in the normal cour e change in the public share price of Chinese banks will have little effect on bank firm
manager , becau e of the a bsence of a market for corporate control;
th e inab ility of dissati fied (public) shareholders to depo e director ;
th e inability of those same shareholder to cause elected directors
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(or the relatively powerless 'independent directors") to change management; a mostly non-existent private (shareholder ') right of action;
and the ba ic tension between (1) a Board of Director that formally
works in the interest of shareholders, and (2) a Party ommirtee
which trumps the Board of Directors ab olutely in term of c ntralized
management.
Yet, this analysis may take the corporate form a e rablished in
modern China too seriou ly, or too formally, and neglect rhe way in
which the public share price can determine the fate (and career) of the
real managers in a PR state-controlled bank, and thereby provide
incentive for better performance and loyal performance. For individuals who staff the leadership of China's sta re-controlled banks,
whether as formal directors or officers, or most importantly as member of the Party Committee that really provides direction to the Board
of Directors, are members of China's modern nomenklatura. They
are important Party-and then stare/government, and then sy tern
(xitong) and then firm-personnel, who gain advancement and statu
olely as part of the nomenklatura system. Therefore, the Parry, which
hold real power vis-a-vis China's state institutions, administrative
bodies, and state-controlled enterprises is intimately concerned with
how they manage the various ta ks entrusted to them-from Ministerial posts to state-controlled enterprise leadership. It is in this regard
that the public hare price of a corporatized banking firm-whether
on the NYSE, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, or in Shanghai-will
have a very ignificant impact upon a Party appointee advancement
within the Party political (and per onnel) y tern. Thus, even if the
market price of Chinese bank shares reflect only valuation of a tiny
float (no more rhan 30%), it eems highly probably that the Parryappointed personnel who actually control hina' banks-whether
or not they are formally appointed director , officer , or enior-level
managers-will be held accountable by the Party system for rhe public
stock price of the bank. If the bank underperforms, or is perceived to
be governed badly or is subject to conflicting imperatives, the public
price will fall. This in turn shou ld lead to action or threatened action
against the Parry Committee member and Party appointees holding corporate positions-whether dismissal, demotion, or just frustration of career advancement. Party official appointed to serve at
bank institutions that perform and are well-perceived in the capital markets, thus conjuring a po itive stock price trajectory, will be
rewarded and see advancement.
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Granted, these observations also lie in the realm of theory at this
point, precisely because none of the Big Four and a Half which do have
public Ii ting have seen a marked decline in their share prices not
related to a global failure and thus immediate action against the
nomenklatura members assigned to manage such firms. otwithstanding, the view provides an idea that at least one part of the
corporatization and public Ii ting reform project may be effective
in governing centralized management at China's banks-something
ob ervers might have thought impossible upon a true under randing
of the lopsided capital tructure and Party domination of China'
"reformed' banking in titutions. Corporate law and governan e theory tell u that the corporate form will allow "shareholders" to monitor firm 'manager . 'The unique circumstances of China' SOEs and
tate-owned bank however allow shareholders to take advantage of
only one of their traditional monitoring mechanisms of 'vote," ' ell,'
or' ue." hareholders in China's banks may only sell their hare · yet
tho e a le wil l cau ea decline in the stock price, and thereby directly
impact one very important performance metric for the real control
partie at Chine e banks-the senior political cadres who have re urfaced as "directors" or "CEOs. " Without doubt, thi is not the optimal
monitorin g mechani m, and many will see this as a mo t attenuated
and unsure imposition of accountability. While this is true at ome
level, th re are two important responses to the objection: (1) that
th ere is a monitoring mechanism in existence at all (re ponding to the
widely held view that large Chinese SOEs are simply not ubj ect to
any monitoring)· (2) it is as attenuated- and indirect-a any mech ani m provided to widely dispersed shareholders in a We tern public
ompany. ompare the real power and leverage to monitor and effect
change of the millions of hareholders in so-called ' developed market" banking giants like Citigroup, Merrill Lyn h, UBS, or Deur che
Bank. While in formal terms shareholders in such We tern banking
giant have a richer arsenal at their disposal-voting for and removing director , the threat of takeover (market for corporate contr I),
and cla action ecuritie fraud suits or derivative law uit for br a h
of .fiduciary dutie -the reality is that management in u h international banking giants are as well-protected a the direct r and officer
of newly corporatized Chin ese banks, or tho e who 'gov rn behind
the curtain" (chuilian tingzheng) from the po t of Party ommittee
lead r. hin e e state-controlled banks thus hare with th ir devel oped economy peers a basic mechanism for identifying and enfor ing
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corporate accountability-the public share price of the firm, and the
financial media's attention to it. While in the West, this ma y result in
the dismissal of a powerful CEO (witness the fate of Merrill Lynch's
Stan O'Neal or Citigroup's Chuck Prince), in China, it may re ult in
the dismissal or end of career advancement for any real power at a
Chinese state-owned bank. Thus, what becomes most impo rtant for
governance at Chinese state-controlled banks is much the same as that
wh ich determines the fate of Western bank executives and directors:
(1) securities regulation that mandates disclosure and transparency
(especially vis-a-vis financial performance); and (2) an independent
media to raise, investigate, and highlight bad business deci ions, shirking, incompetence, conilicted dealings, or corporate corruption. China
and China's state-owned, publicly listed banks in large mea ure have
both of those things: (1) the benefit of state-of-the-art securities regulation (as four of the banks included in the Big Four and a Half have
listings outside of China and have thus subjected themselves to foreign
securities and exchange regulation) and strong disclosure obliga tions,
and (2) a significant media inquiry-from both foreign media and
the incredibly independent and well-versed Chinese financial media.
The unreality of Chinese share prices prior to the global meltdown in
2008-whether listed inside the PRC or abroad-could not continue
forever . Once these wild over-valuations receded, and after the world
move through the global crisis of 2008 and equity markets once again
reflect firm fundamentals, the public stock price of hina's different
state-controlled banks may well see profoundly negative movements,
which will necessarily affect the careers and promotion pro pects of
managers of these important financial institutions.
The corporatization and public listing of China's major statecontrolled banks was supposed to do everal thing . Important among
the range of hoped-for effects was the creation of the conditions for
serious monitoring and real accountability at such banks, and therefore a new world of efficiency and productivity. otwith tanding
those admirable aims, and the introduction of new legal and financial structures, the peculiarities of China's "corporatization-not privatization" (among many factors) has led to widely acknowledged
and seemingly insurmountable ob tacles to such monitoring of and
accountability for banking firm in iders. However, that disappointment must be tempered by a recognition as to how one aspect of
China's banking reform-the phenomenon of a public price for a
thin, and widely dispersed, lice of ownership of the firm-does
affect China's seemingly hidden and unaccountable managers, the
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nomenklatura who continue to staff the controlling heights of China's
banks. This mechanism will only become more effective as China's
banks return to the PRC for A-share listing on the Shanghai Stock
Exchange, where the watching shareholders will be Chinese citizens
(not star-struck foreign fund managers), and an ever-increasingly
independent and critical Ch inese financial media.
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The author would like ro thank Ms Marianne Chow and Mr Timothy Throm,
both Unive r icy of Michigan J.D. law graduates for their invaluable research
a si tan e, and professors Piecer Boctelier, Ken Lieberrhal, and Z hao Minyuan
for their kind and detailed comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.
Amended very ignificancly with effect from January 1, 2006. See Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Gongsifa (The Company Law of the People's Republic
of hin a), pas ed by the Eighteenth Session of the Standing Committee of the
Tenth ational People's Congress on October 27, 2005 (CLC 2006: 1-1).
Before the People's Bank of China (PBC, Chinas central bank) started additiona l, bur critical, policy reforms including interest race liberalization and
increased re erve requirements.
Thi i properly contra red with two related a pect : Fir t, the regulatory and
externally imposed reform trategy effected via the direct expert, and purportedly neutra l regulation of commercial banking operations in China by a
government agency like the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)
(to be contrasted in turn with what is so often the case in modern China : a
regulatory actor which is also the owner and operator of the firms that it regulates (for example, the Ministry of Information Industry (MIT) of the PRC,
successor to the regulatory brief of the former Ministry of Po t and Telecommunication (MPT), which maintains indirect ownership of, and operationa l
control over, the several post-monopoly telecoms operators); second, the many
aspects of hina's bank reform that seek to remedy hi torical problem (like
unrealizable as ers).
One anal yst has written about these reforms-after 1992-93 and before
2003-04-as occurring in three distinct stages: (1) dampening the overheating
of the Chinese economy in 1992-93, promulgation of the legislative bases for
the financial sector (that is, a Central Bank Law and the Commercial Bank
Law in 1995), and separation out of the "policy" functions from China'
banks; (2) strengtheni ng bank regulation with a five-tier cla ification yscem
(commen ed experimenta ll y in 1998 and then formally adopted in 2001 )
recapitalization of the Big Four in 1998 (RMB270 billion), and the creation of
as er management companies as the "purchasers" of bad bank debt to clear up
bank balance sheets (from 1999); and (3) allowing greater foreign and dome tic competition via specific approvals and acces ion to the WTO establi hment and empowering a new government agen y tasked with expert regulation
of the fin ancia l sector (the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBR )
in 2003, the creation of a new state shareholder for the banks and a the
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vehicle for further capitalizations (Huijin, established December 2003), and
the implementation of new capital adequacy standards (conforming to Ba el
I in 2000 and Ba el 11 from 2004 ) (Ito 2006) . See also the basic role clai med
for China's path ro conformity wirh the Basel capital adequacy standa rds
by PBC Governor Z hou Xiaochuan between the promulgation of the PRC
Commercial Bank Law in 1995 and the following decade (Zhou Xiao huan
2000: 74-6) and The Economist's excellent summary of rhe complete reform
program (Economist 2005 ).
For example, the early and basic separation out of "policy' lending functions
from what became Chin as "commercial" banks recast the central purpose
of Chinas banking firms, initially in name only, but increasingly in reality
(especia ll y after new "policy" banks (such as the China Development Bank)
were established and became operative) . Sirnjlarly, and a i discu sed below
one round of bank recapitalization (in that ca e, using China's abundant foreign exchange reserves) enabled the birth of a dynamic and deeply engaged
state shareholder (Huijin ) and thus the first viable replacement of the formerly "absent principal" at China's state-"owned" bank . A final example
of how divergent strain s of the bank reform program impact on governance
and operations wo uld be the way in which C hin a's new banking industry
regulator-the CBRC established in March 2003-mandated asset (loan) ri k
cla ilications for far more accurate and transparent internal monitoring at
China's banks.
The Shenzhen Development Bank was in fact the fir t i suer of any type
permitted to list "A-shares" on the Shenzhen Srock Exchange, a listing that
incidentally triggered off August 10, 1992 (the "8 .10" incident) riots in the
henzhen pecial Economic Zone, which in turn led directly to the esrablishmenr of rhe China Securities Regulatory ommis ion ( SR ). In rhe years
following the Shenzhen Development Bank ' corporatizarion and then listing
in 1992, a ll of the 12 national commercia l banks have been e tablished a
or converted into, companie limfred by hares, with many gai ning A-share
listing .
Underway, at the time of thi s wri tin g.
Importantly as none of the foreign inve tors wa in the commercial banking indu try, each can be seen as a fore ign "financia l" (strategic) investor:
investor who bring other bu iness line to I B ( o ldman underwriting
Allianz in urance and American Express credit cards), and nor a rrong line in
commercia l bank opera tions or even corporate governance in rhe commercial
banking sector.
At the time of its strategic investment, Goldm an entered into the "Strategic
Coopera tion Agreement" with the Bank for a term of five (5) year , in which
the Agree ment promised the establi hmenr o f a " jo int steering committee,"
" jo int working gro ups," and a project management office residing at each of
the Bank and Goldman Sachs to implement overa ll "strategic cooperation",
deemed to include coo peration in " o rpora te gove rn ance" of the new Bank.
(ICBC 2006: 91)
Repeated by PB Governor Zhou Xiaochuan publicly in 2005.
As of the time of this writing, Huijin was upposed to have been fo ld ed into
Chi na's new sovereign fund in ve tor, hin a In vestment orporario n (CIC),
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wh ich was ro take over Huijin s existing equity positions in Chinas banks.
This make en e, as the source of the inve tmenr capital of both Huijin and the
succes or CIC i the PR C's abundant foreign exchange reserves, which need to
gain a better return and be directed away from China's already over-heating
domestic economy. Yet, there is word in Beij ing that Huijin has only been
brought in as a subsidiary of CIC, and may be re-established as an independent
entity on e again. However, Huijin i structured and governed going forward,
what remains to be een is if the dynamism and focus seen at Hu ijin wi ll be
mainrained once it is part of a larger investment concern . Interestingly all
of I ' initia l foreign investment were in the financial sector, including the
Black tone lPO and a helping hand extended to Morgan Stanley.
lntere tingly, and seeming proof of the notion in some quarter of the PRC
about the effect of foreign invesanent ome of this foreign investment bought
out exi ring ( tate) hareholders in the non Big Fo ur and a Half commercial
bank in olved, and thus provided no new capital for the investee bank . In
this en e, the subje r deals were all about PRC scare and local government
acror ca bing our of commercial bank investments, and ceding some level of
governance contro l to the foreign entrant ( ee Howson and Ros 2003 ).
As this chapter focuse on corporate governance reform, the second prong
of "foreign' involvement-the introduction of foreign banking competition
into the PR -is nor addressed. Suffice ro say that such foreign comp tition
has proven to be one of the most effective purs to improved performance by
China's rate-owned banks.
See the 2007 McKinsey "alert" to its foreign clients regarding this fact obviou ly omething that the con ulrancy thought was relatively underappre iated:
" . . . the ommunist Party committee plays a pivota l role in key deci ion -for
exampl , th nomination of top executives, executive evaluation and compen ation, a set acquisition a nd dispo als, and annual budget . Sometimes
the Party committee may even get involved in operationa l decisions ... "
(McKinsey 2007) .
For in ranee, the BOC IPO prospectus listed awkwardly and in complete
i olation, the name "Zhang Lin " as Secretary of the "Parry Di cipline 0111mittee' of the Bank in the frame of mandato ry disclo ure of "directors"
and "o fficers " Ii r his experience (a t the lmporr-Exporr Bank f China),
bur ay nor one word about what the " Pa rry Discipl ine o mmittee' i ,
or how it function . or is there any other mention of this ommittee or
the " e retary" of which is all uded to in the ro ter of enior ma nagement,
in any other part of the Pro pecrus (BOC 2006: 208 ). The ame i true
of the ICBC in it lPO disclo ure that lists under "Ma nagement Mr Liu
Lixian, a former Vice-President of the same bank' a set management company ( hin a Huarong), as the Secretary of the Bank's Party Di cipline Committee (I BC 2006: 179). That small squjb de ribing Liu Li.x.ian, and the
tabular pre entation of" en ior Management" (that Ii t ' Mr. LIU Lixian, 52
ecretary of party di cipline committee' (I B 2006: 178) i the only mention
of rhe Party Discipline Committee, and in a ecrion that include " directors '
"supervi or ,' a nd" enior management, " and follow with fulsome di clo ure
on the Board's strategy, a udit, risk management, nomination , and ompen ation comm ittees (ICBC 2006: 171-83).
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How often will the Board, dominated by individu als selected as director by
the ame Party Commircee, refuse the Party Committee's suggestion?
Jiang rather cheekily confirms that the almost 20% foreign strategic investor in
rhi particular bank under rand , and appa rently approves, of this governa nce
template "with Chinese characteristics", saying "We have discussed thi with
HSBC. Sir John Bond sa id , I know you Uiang] are the Parry Secretary and this
is why you shou ld be chairman. The guy didn t think it strange at all" (Hu
Run feng Cheng Zhe, and Fu Tao 2006: 72). So much for foreign strategic
investors changing Chinese corporate governance; it would eem that the
particular conditions for entry into the Chinese market ma y sh ift rhe direction
of influence!
To the effect that 'the Bank of China 's independent British independent
director wanted to p articipate in the Parry Committee but ince he wa not a
Communist Party member, he tried to find a British Communist to participate
on his behalf" (Zhang Xiaocai 2005 ).
China Telecom's Deputy CEO Huang Wenlin moved to China Mobile, hina
Mobile's Deputy CEO Zhang Zhenxiang moved to China Telecom, while
China Unicorn's Hong Kong established "red-chip " (listed i suer' ) Executive
Director Li Jianguo moved to China Netcom, and China Netcom s Director
Miao Jianhua went to China Unicom (Xinjing Bao 2007: BOS).
Witness the following disclosed example : the BoCom's Jinzhou Branc h's fa lsification of documents and (in cooperation with corrupt local courts) judgments
to fraudulentl y write off RMB221 million of " bad loans" extended to 175
enterprises (and report the same to the Bank's corporate headquarters), alI the
while continuing to collect interest and principal payments, or exercise on collateral, on the alleged ly " bad " debt, and assigning those proceed to per anal
accounts· or a sim ilar fraud practiced by the Taiyuan Bran h of BoCom (using
forged seals) to embezzle RMB345 million (BoCom Annual Report 2005:
155); the CCB' subsidiary braoche hiding impaired loans, even befo re that
Bank's celebrated IPO (Barboza 2006)· the bribery charges leveled at the same
Bank 's qua i-independent sub-branche (CCB 2005: 121 )· the BOC's di closure in its IPO offering document of the "Heilongj iang Incidents" (the manager
of a Heilongjiang sub-branc h transferred RMB939 million from customer
accounts to the manager's per anal accounts), fraudul ent procurement of
bank acceptances by the Simalu sub-bra nch manager Beijing branch emplo yees arranging RMB6 70 million in home mortgage loan ub eq uently diverted,
and the notorious misappropriation of US$4 82 million by the managers of the
Ka iping branch (BOC 2006: 161-2); and the !C B £PO offering document
(I BC 2006: 134- 6) is filled with horror stories of the malfeasa nce and crimina l action at its enormous branch network, as was the hine e press even at
the moment of its IPO (Ling H uawei and H e Xiaoxin 2006: 41). The situation
at the Agricultural Bank of China, with its almost half a million employees,
ma y be even worse when revea led in connection with its reorganization a nd
public listing (see www.iht.com/anicle /200 7/01/21/bu ines .bank.php).
The valuation for elling state shareho lders was tied to balance sheet valuation,
and provision for NPLs, but was conditioned (or subject to purchase price
adjustment arising from) an intervening investigation of the qua lity of bank
assets. The acquirer (TPG) identified a higher volume of NPLs between signing
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and closing, and thus required a negative purchase price adj ustment from the
ex iting state shareholders (H owson and Ross 2003) .
No doubt, in the wider Chinese politica l and economic context, there are
other reasons w hy che government and the Party are shy of the cl ass actio n
mechan ism and contingency fee arrangements.
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